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Note to: Interested Parties
From: Michael McKenna
MWR Strategies
Date: August 25, 2004
Re: Survey Analysis
We have attached the summary results of our most recent nationwide of likely voters. The survey, conducted August 22 to August 24, included 600 likely voters (margin of error, 4.0%). The results are straightforward, but we wanted to offer a few contextual thoughts.
First, despite those who identify themselves as undecided, at this point we believe that there are few truly undecided voters remaining in this election cycle. It seems that voters are split into three camps; those who will vote for President Bush, those who will not vote for President Bush, and those who will not vote at all. The first group is set, as is the third. The only group with any real mystery left about it is the middle group. Right now they appear to be poised to split their votes in unequal portions between Senator Kerry and Ralph Nader. But there is some fraction of this group that may migrate to the group that plans to not vote at all. Therein is the real combat of this campaign - the effort either to move Kerry voters into the nonvoting column or to keep them in the Kerry column.
In short, absent an extraordinary event (and this month's numbers suggest not even such an event might change the calculus), the only substantial change in the electorate thing that can happen at this point is that Kerry can disqualify himself (or be disqualified) from being President. This is why the swift boat imbroglio has assumed importance beyond its probative value -- because it potentially serves to alert some voters that some portion of Kerry's biography may be open to question. That acts to undermine both his integrity and the patient and careful case he has built that he can trusted with both the lives of young Americans, as well as 10,000 nuclear warheads, as commander in chief. The Kerry campaign cannot leave the issue unaddressed, especially since there are lingering doubts about his toughness with respect to terrorism.
Second, there remains a consistent belief that President Bush is going to win this race. This expectation has substantial and pervasive consequences for the campaign and, ultimately, the election. Voters who think their candidate is likely to win are much more likely to give money, and (more importantly in this cycle) show up to vote. Conversely, voters who suspect that their candidate will lose are less likely to give money and (again, more importantly) less likely to show up to vote. For these reasons, we believe that at this point in the election cycle, this number might be more important than the more simple (and often times less reliable) question about for whom people plan to vote.
Third, we were surprised that respondents were so closely split about the characterization of terrorism. Despite the Administration's consistent and pervasive rhetoric identifying terrorism as evil, the respondents were split about evenly as to whether it is an evil to be destroyed or a problem to be managed. This is important because it provides an opportunity for the Kerry campaign to play to their strengths. If terrorism is in fact a problem to be managed and bureaucratized, then the Europeans are in large measure correct about what needs to be done, and in turn Kerry is right about his proposed approaches. This is a number that bears some watching.
Finally, as the professional talkers struggle to understand the absence of a post-convention bump for Senator Kerry, in addition to the campaign dynamics noted above, it might be helpful to reflect on the expectations that voters have as they watch and listen to a political convention. Voters understand the scripted nature of the political conventions and discount them accordingly.
If I can be of any assistance, please don't hesitate to contact me at 703-801-6587.
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